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INTRODUCTION

This Essay attempts to show some of the important connections
between the Continental tradition of semiotics, American Legal Realism, and the Critical Legal Studies movement. Semiotics, the study of
signs and systems of signification, was developed independently by
two thinkers, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and
the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Much of the literature in
legal semiotics has followed the Peircian tradition, but ironically, its
connections with progressive movements in American legal theory
have not always been clear.' This Essay offers an alternative way of
uniting legal semiotics with legal theory in America. It argues that
the line of inquiry begun by Saussure, and continued by the French
* Copyright 1990 by J.M. Balkin.
* J.M. Balkin is a Professor of Law and Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody
Centennial Faculty Fellow, at the University of Texas School of Law. An earlier version of
this Essay was presented as part of the third annual Round Table on Law and Semiotics at
Pennsylvania State University. The author would like to thank Sandy Levinson, Joan
Mahoney, Gary Peller, and John Robertson for their comments on previous drafts.
1. For a good introduction to Peirce's relevance to legal theory, see B. KEVELSON, THE
LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS (1988). Peirce and his followers referred to the study of signs as
"semiotics," e.g., U. Eco, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976), while many (but by no means all)
of the continental theorists followed Saussure in using the word "semiology," e.g., R.
BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (1967). Except when specifically referring to Saussure's
theories of the sign, I use the term "semiotics" in this Essay.
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structuralists and post-structuralists, is not only an especially fertile

way of approaching the study of legal semiotics, but that this semiotics can be more readily adapted to understanding politics and ideology as they are expressed in and disguised in legal thought. For this
reason, there is a very natural affinity between Saussure's semiology,
on the one hand, and the work of the legal realists and the modem

Critical Legal Studies movement on the other.
I begin my discussion with the ideas of the person who was, in

my view, the first legal semiotician-Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.
Lawyers and legal historians are familiar with Hohfeld for other reasons. He was, after all, a very famous law professor who in his short
life had a considerable impact on analytical jurisprudence, and his
influence can be felt in a number of areas of legal thought today. In
the law of standing, for example, it is commonplace to refer to certain
types of plaintiffs as being either Hohfeldian or non-Hohfeldian
depending upon what kind of interest they have in a particular legal

action.
Of course, calling Hohfeld the first legal semiotician is revisionist
history, for Hohfeld would probably have been very surprised at the
thought that he was practicing semiotics. He probably believed that

he was studying analytical jurisprudence and the law of property.
Nevertheless, Hohfeld deserves to be called the first legal semiotician

because he was the first to systematically and self-consciously discuss
legal concepts such as rights, duties, and privileges rhetorically and as
a system of mutually self-defining relations. Hohfeld explained his
theory of legal rights in a famous article called Some Fundamental

Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, published in
1913. 3
2. Eg., Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). We have little information about Hohfeld's life. He
left Stanford to join the Yale law faculty in 1914 and died in 1918 at the age of 38. Both
Arthur Corbin and Walter Wheeler Cook greatly admired him, and in fact, Corbin helped
secure his appointment on the Yale faculty. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
LEGAL REALIST MOVEMENT 34-35 (1973). Hohfeld also made a lasting impression on one of
his most famous students, Karl Llewellyn. Id. at 35. There is a brief biographical sketch in
Corbin's introduction to W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING Vii-XV (W. Cook ed. 1978), and a portrait of Hohfeld as a teacher in K.
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 491-94 (1962). For
discussions of Hohfeld's system, see Cook, Hoheld's Contributions to the Science of Law, 28
YALE L.J. 721 (1919); Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226
(1921); and Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).

3. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions]. A
continuation of the article appeared 4 years later in Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions

as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). Hohfeld actually stands at the end
of a long line of scholars of analytical jurisprudence who were concerned with the relationships
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The fact that this theory (which we may assume Hohfeld had
been working on for some time) was first published in 1913 has always
struck me as quite interesting. After all, this was only two years after
Saussure gave his famous third set of lectures on the foundations of
language, which marked the beginning of European semiology.4
Indeed, one reason we can be quite sure that Hohfeld would not have
considered himself a semiotician is that the word had just been
invented.
Nevertheless, there is a remarkable similarity between what
Saussure was doing in linguistics and what Hohfeld was doing in analytical jurisprudence. Saussure's semiology is based upon two important concepts. The first is the arbitrary relationship between the
signifier and the thing signified, and the second is that signs take their
meaning from their mutual relationships in a system of signification.'
These two ideas are related to each other. If there is no natural connection between a signifier and its referent or usage, its meaning must
come from the way it is contrasted to other signifiers. Thus, the relation between signifier and signified is mediated by the relationship of
signifiers to each other in a general system of signification. Meaning
in language, then, comes from the play of differences. 6 A system of
signification is the essence of language. Indeed, we can go so far as to
say that the proper object of linguistic study is not words themselves
but the relationships of words to each other.
between legal concepts. In particular, his work builds on the jurisprudence of John Austin and
John Salmond. For useful discussions, see A. KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS (1927); and
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 975.
4. See F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (WN.Baskin trans. 1959).
5. Id at 67-70, 114-22. For example, the continuum of color is divided into several
English words like "blue," "brown," "red," and so on. By the "arbitrary" connection between
signifier and signified, Saussure meant two things. First, there is no necessary connection
between a word and the shades of color it stands for. For example, what we call "blue" could
as easily be called "blooff." Second, and more important, the particular grouping of shades of
color among the various concepts denoted by English words is also a matter of linguistic
convention. In English, light blue and dark blue are both "blue"; in Russian they have distinct
names and are different colors. J. CULLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE 31-36 (1986). In like

fashion, the boundaries between what is "violet" and what is "blue" may vary from language
to language. According to Saussure, then, language "carves up" the world into a conceptual
scheme-it not only describes reality, but also produces it. The way in which the world is
carved up is a matter of conventions, and different languages do this in different ways. For this
reason, words do not simply describe pre-existing concepts-rather concepts are produced by
the division and organization of reality by language. Hence, linguistic meaning is produced by
the differences between the various concepts in a language. The meaning of "blue" is derived
from its differences from other concepts--"blue" is that which is not brown, red, and so forth.
See F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 4, at 116-17.
6. And, here of course, one can see the influence of Saussure on deconstruction. See J.
CULLER, supra note 5, at 127-30.
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Remarkably enough, Hohfeld was coming to similar conclusions
about legal rights at about this same time, and his ideas would eventually be amplified by the legal realists that he influenced. If Saussure
offers a theory of the arbitrary nature of the sign, Hohfeld offers us a
theory of the arbitrary nature of a right, or more generally, of any
legally protected interest. The nature and extent of a person's rights
are dependent upon the correlative duties of others. 7 Just as a signifier does not take its meaning from the connection between itself and
its signified, a right does not owe its existence to its connection to an
individual, or a piece of property. Rather, a right is simply a legal
guarantee that one has the privilege to engage in certain actions and
invoke the power of the state to prevent other persons from engaging
in certain other actions. Thus, my right of freedom of speech is
defined by my right to inflict emotional injury on you when I say
things that you do not like, as well as your nonright to prevent me
from doing so and the government's duty to protect me in my infliction of injury on you.' Indeed, not only do rights become mutually
self-defining, but so do legally cognizable injuries, for a legally cognizable injury is simply the flip side of a legally protected interest. A
property right, then, is not an attribute or thing that inheres in the
property itself, or in its owner. Rather, it is the state's legal sanction
to perform or refrain from performing certain types of actions. I have
a right to the use of my property to the extent that I cannot be punished or penalized for my use of it. Conversely, my property rights
are unlawfully abridged to the extent that the state will penalize those
persons who interfere with them. 9
7. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 3, at 32. In Hohfeld's
system, each type of legal interest is accompanied by a matching interest held by at least one
other person. Hohfeld called this matching interest a jural correlative. Id. at 30. Thus, the
correlative of a Hohfeldian right is a duty, the correlative of a privilege is a no-right, the
correlative of a power is a liability, and the correlative of an immunity is a disability. Id.
Moreover, each legal interest has not only ajural correlative but ajural "opposite." Whereas a
jural correlative is what others must have if one has a legally protected interest, a jural opposite
is what one cannot have if one has a legally protected interest with respect to a certain type of
act. Id. at 32-33. Thus, if one has a right, one cannot simultaneously have a no-right, if one
has a privilege, one cannot have a duty, having a power precludes having a disability, and
having an immunity precludes having a liability. Id. at 30.
8. See id. at 37 ("To the extent that the defendants have privileges the plaintiffs have no
rights; and conversely, to the extent that the plaintiffs have rights the defendants have no
privileges.").
9. Hohfeld was careful to distinguish "claim" rights, which he called rights, from
"liberty" rights, which are similar to what he called privileges. A claim right creates a
correlative duty on the part of private parties not to interfere with the exercise of that right. A
liberty right only guarantees that a person exercising the privilege will not be held liable for the
exercise, and that others cannot invoke the power of the state to prevent the exercise. For
example, my claim right (a Hohfeldian right) to the exclusive possession of my property carries
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It follows from Hohfeld's work that what constitutes a legally

protected interest is arbitrary, and is not defined by the nature of
things. Rather, the "nature of things" in a legal sense is defined by
the mutually self-defined relations of legal ideas. Just as reality is
shaped and created by language, so too legal and political reality is
shaped and created by mutually defined legal and political rights,

powers, and duties. The state's allocation of legally sanctioned violence is established by mutually self-defining relations, and is not

derivable from the concept of right itself, just as the concepts involved
in our understanding of reality are mutually self-defining-their particular contours are -not necessitated by things in themselves. Put
another way, concepts like private property, consent, and liberty do
not simply re-present previously existing things in the world. Rather,

they result from the system of differences between legal and moral
concepts, and in so doing constitute the political world that we live in.

As this last statement demonstrates, Hohfeld's insight had quite
radical implications, although it was at first misunderstood as simply
a retreat into conceptualism and formalism. In fact, however, it led to
a devastating critique of these forms of legal thought, a critique from
which we have never quite recovered.10 Indeed, one can say without
too much exaggeration that Hohfeld's analysis of rights discourse
made much of the later work of the legal realists possible.
Having introduced the subject of legal realism, and the legal real-

ist critique, I should perhaps interject a historiographical remark
about them, or rather, the specific features of legal realism that I have
in mind. When most people think of legal realism, they recall the
aphorism that the law is what the judge had for breakfast, or, more
seriously, the credo of legal realists that law should eschew unnecessary abstraction in favor of sound principles of social science. To be
with it a duty on the part of others not to trespass. See id. at 32. However, my freedom or
liberty (a Hohfeldian privilege) to use my property to generate income does not necessarily
carry with it the right to prevent others from engaging in acts that might reduce my enjoyment
of that freedom. For example, my freedom to open a fast food franchise does not necessarily
involve the right to prevent a competitor from setting up a business across the street and
cutting into my profit margins. Put another way, my freedom (privilege) to use my property is
limited not only by state imposed restrictions on its use and disposition but also by my
competitor's freedom to compete. Hohfeld's analysis of rights discourse emphasized that
liberties or privileges do not necessarily entail rights to avoid all types of harms created by
other private actors. See id. at 34-35.
10. For a good introduction to the legal realist critique of classical legal thought, see
Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understandingof Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical
Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3 (1980); Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151 (1985); and Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book
Review), 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465 (1988) (reviewing L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:
1927-1960 (1986)).
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sure, many of the people that we call legal realists believed something
very much like this."' However, there is another sort of legal realism,
more radical in its possibilities, that I am concerned with here. It is
the strand of legal realist writing which focused on the political and
ideological character of legal reasoning. 12 Quite apart from investigating the judge's diet, it was concerned with showing that seemingly
neutral, natural, and apolitical concepts like the market, private property, or consent depended upon a set of political choices that were not
necessary--choices that could be altered in the public interest once
their contingent nature was made clear. It is this aspect
of legal real13
ism that depended so heavily on Hohfeld's theories.
Thinkers like Felix and Morris Cohen and Robert Hale owed
much to the analysis of rights latent in Hohfeld's work. For their
argument was that when one asserted that A had the right to contract
or not to contract with B, one was simultaneously making a statement
about B's rights. Moreover, the allocation of rights and duties
between A and B was not derived from the inherent meaning of contract, consent, duress, or bargain, but was a demarcation of power
created by the state's common law for which the state was ultimately
responsible. 4 And indeed, emboldened by Hohfeld's critique, one
11. On the social science strand of legal realism, see, e.g., Cook, Scientific Method and the
Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927); Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1923); Moore & Sussman, Legal and InstitutionalMethods Applied to the Debiting of
Direct Discounts-I.Legal Method: Banker's Set-off, 40 YALE L.J. 381 (1931); and Oliphant,
A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1928). For an excellent study of the history of
"scientific" realism, see Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: From
the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979); and Schlegel, American Legal Realism
and EmpiricalSocial Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV.
195 (1980).
12. Peller refers to this as the "deconstructive" strand of legal realism, Peller, supra note
10, at 1222, and although this might seem to be an anachronism, it is quite true we would
recognize the methodology of many of these legal realists as a form of deconstruction.
13. Eg., F. Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); F.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L. J. 779 (1918);
Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1947); Hale,
Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923); Hale, Law
Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451 (1920). I would also include with
this group of works M. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933), and M.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Although his son Felix Cohen is
usually considered a realist, Morris Cohen is best described as a sympathetic critic of realism.
See, e.g., M. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 352 (1931)
(raising objections to the extreme positivism and nominalism found in the work of Oliphant,
Bingham, and Moore). Nevertheless, Cohen's analyses of the relation between public and
private power are as trenchant as anything the realists produced. Thus, he has much in
common with the "deconstructive" strand of realism.
14. M. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,supra note 13, at 586.
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could go further and argue that the concept of property itself had no
essential content, but was merely defined in opposition to other rights
of contract, criminal law, and so on. Thus, the ultimate point of the
Hohfeldian analytic was that contract and property rights did not
refer to real entities, but to particular contingent allocations of power
created and enforced by state actors, that divided up the permissible
forms of private power. In this way, everything that seemed to be the
product of private action between private individuals was in fact supported by a series of state decisions allocating people's rights and
duties. For this reason, I believe that we should also count this more
radical strain of legal realism as constituting a semiotic tradition, even
though it was not self-consciously semiotic.
A second point about Hohfeld's work, which I think was not
sufficiently emphasized by the legal realists, was that his theories
about judicial language were not specific to any type of rights. Thus,
although the legal realists were mainly concerned with contract and
property rights, and the general subject of economic regulation, the
Hohfeldian analytic applies equally well to rights of free expression,
sexual autonomy, equal treatment, or any other particular interest
that the law might seek to protect. This fact, I believe, has only
recently begun to be understood. Indeed, I would argue that recent
feminist critiques of pornography make use of several arguments that
are derived from Hohfeld.
For example, one such argument is that protection of the private
speech of pornographers establishes a system of private power that
silences women and contributes to their subordination. In Hohfeldian
terms, to the extent that the state protects the rights of
pornographers, it allows women to be injured by the deleterious
effects of pornography. Moreover, some feminists argue that protection of pornography actually reduces the real (as opposed to formal)
freedom of women to speak. This is analogous to the realists' analysis
of contract rights-the realists argued that one does not have freedom
of contract if the economic system created by the state's laws puts one
in a situation of vastly unequal bargaining power. Similarly, the feminist critique of traditional first amendment jurisprudence argues that
one does not really have free speech if one is not taken seriously or is
unable or even afraid to speak because of one's subordinated role in
society. The state enforced freedom of the pornographer to speak
results in the silencing of women harmed by pornography, even
though the formal right to speak is guaranteed.15 From the feminist
critique we can see that "free speech," like contract or property, is an
15. See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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arbitrary signifier whose meaning is constituted by the system of differences between it and other legal and political concepts, and simultaneously constitutes relations of power in our society.
II. AN EXAMPLE OF HOHFELDIAN SEMIOTICS
I would now like to offer an example of how the Hohfeldian analysis of legal concepts works in practice, and how this semiotic
approach takes us directly from linguistic categorization into the
study of political and ideological thought. The example given here is
directly in the legal realist tradition; both in the form of analysis and
in the subject matter, as it concerns economic regulation, private
property and accident law. Suppose that the failure of General
Motors (GM) to equip its vehicles with airbags costs the American
public some $300 thousand a year in accident costs, including pain,
suffering, and medical expenses. Suppose also that it would cost GM
only $200 thousand a year to install airbags in its automobiles. Now
assume that a series of lawsuits is brought against GM by plaintiffs
who were driving GM cars and got into accidents; the plaintiffs sue
GM for the additional injuries caused by GM's failure to install
airbags in the cars they were driving. Should we make GM pay for
their injuries? If we adopt a negligence standard for unintentionally
caused injuries, we would conclude that yes, of course GM should
pay, because $200 thousand a year is less than $300 thousand a year.
That is to say, the burden of taking safety precautions is less than the
expected loss from the failure to take those precautions. GM is therefore at fault and should have to pay.
Note that this is a fault based argument for a standard of negligence-if you cause injury by not taking precautions that are costbenefit justified from the standpoint of society as a whole, you have
done something morally wrong and therefore should pay damages.
Moreover, this argument is based upon common sense notions of
fault, causation, and harm. A person or corporation that fails to take
such cost-benefit justified precautions is at fault, and because the failure to take those precautions causes harm to others, they should have
to pay money damages. But each of these concepts-fault, causation,
and harm-is a legal concept that does not simply stand for an independently existing entity in the real world. Rather, the concepts of
fault, causation, and harm obtain their meaning from their relation to
other legal concepts-for example, property and contract rights.
Thus, imagine that counsel for GM argues as follows: Why is it
1 (1985);

Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style (Book Review), 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1147,
1162 (1988) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
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just to make GM pay $200 thousand to save $300 thousand in accident costs to perfect strangers? Allowing a cause of action in negligence here will force GM either to install airbags in all of its cars at a
cost of $200 thousand a year or continue to pay money damages at a
rate of $300 thousand a year, as injured plaintiffs line up at the judicial trough to collect huge sums of income without a day's work.
Thus, GM is being forced to divert at least $200 thousand of its hard
earned profits for expenditures it had no desire to undertake. Put
more bluntly, the use of a negligence standard in this case amounts to
outright theft of GM's property and a redistribution to others, either
in the form of direct subsidies, or in a forced investment of capital and
labor in airbag technology.
Perhaps you will object to this argument on the grounds that
GM's property rights are limited by its moral and legal responsibilities to others. Perhaps you will say that GM's property rights end
where its responsibilities to others begin, so that GM may use its
property in any way it wants as long as it does not injure the rights of
others. Thus, because GM's wrongful use of its property caused
injury to others, it has no right to prevent the government from taking
its property.
Yet at this point it should become clear that the concepts of
property and fault are mutually defined. One cannot know whether
GM's property is really being taken unless one knows whether GM is
at fault. Indeed, once we assume that GM is at fault, it is GM who is
taking the property of others-in the form of lost wages, medical
expenses, and pain and suffering-by its callous disregard of human
safety and welfare. Allowing GM to save money by refusing to install
airbags is effectively a wealth transfer from the victims of its negligence to GM. Put another way, not allowing plaintiffs to sue GM for
negligence allows GM to fatten its profit margins through human carnage and the suffering of others.
This example should make clear that notions of property rights
are parasitic upon notiois of fault. But that is only half the story.
Notions of fault are also parasitic on notions of property rights and
contract rights. Let us return to the argument of the counsel for GM.
Perhaps she might concede that if GM were at fault, that there would
be no question of compensation. She might agree with our assessment
that the person who is at fault should bear the risk of loss, and that
one should never be allowed wrongfully to use one's property so as to
injure the rights of others. However, why is it clear that GM is at
fault for not installing airbags? GM has the right to make cars and
place them before the public, and if the public wishes to purchase
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those cars and drive them, that is their choice. There is absolutely no
fault involved in GM's placing its product in the hands of a willing
buyer. GM is merely exercising its rights to free contract.
Any plaintiffs injured in GM cars rode in them out of their own
free will. If they had wanted airbags in their cars, they could have
demanded that the airbags be installed and paid GM for the extra cost
of this option. Alternatively, they could have installed the airbags
themselves or hired a third party to do it, and absorbed the cost in
that fashion. If anyone is at fault for the extra costs incurred by the
plaintiffs, it is the plaintiffs themselves for failing to ask for safety
equipment they now insist should have been in their cars all along.
The person at fault should bear the risk of loss, and should not be able
to shift the loss to persons who make an innocent and lawful use of
their own property.
Indeed, what the plaintiffs really want is to have it both ways.
They are at fault for not asking for airbags that they themselves admit
were necessary, and then, when they get themselves involved in accidents that were not GM's fault, they want GM to subsidize the cost of
the extra safety precautions that they were not willing to pay for in
the first place. There is no problem with the general proposition that
GM may use its property in any way it likes as long as it does not
invade the rights of others. But in this case, GM did not harm the
interests of the plaintiffs or invade the plaintiffs' rights. The plaintiffs
caused their own injury by failing to spend a little extra money for
safety precautions. If anything, holding GM liable allows the plaintiffs to use their contract and property rights to interfere with GM's
property rights because they are now perfectly free to get into accidents and tax GM for their own failure to invest in safety precautions.
To know what the lawful property and contract rights of GM
and the plaintiffs are, we need to know who is at fault for not having
airbags installed in GM cars. However, in order to know who is at
fault, it appears we must first determine what is a lawful use of one's
property or a lawful exercise of the right to contract. With respect to
GM, this involves the nature of products that it can sell to willing
buyers without incurring liability for damages, and conversely, with
respect to the plaintiffs, the boundaries of the concept of assumption
of risk. The concepts of property, contract, and fault are thus mutually defined. Just as Saussure taught us that in linguistics there are no
positive terms, legal terms also have a mutually self-defining quality.
In the more modern language of deconstruction, we would say that
property, contract, and fault exist in a relation of diffirance, of
mutual dependence and differentiation, in which each concept bears
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the traces of the others. 16
Perhaps you may sense that there is something wrong with the
arguments of GM's counsel. Although the concept of fault seems difficult to pin down at first, we can give it determinate content by invoking the concept of causation. We know that GM is at fault because it
was GM's failure to install the airbags that caused the harm to the
plaintiffs. Thus, the notion of fault depends on the more basic idea of
causal responsibility. Yet the notion of causal responsibility is parasitic on other concepts, including fault. Is not the cause of the plaintiffs' harm (1) the plaintiffs' involvement in an accident, which is
either the plaintiffs' fault or that of third parties, but certainly not
GM's and (2) the plaintiffs' failure to demand that airbags be
installed, coupled with (3) plaintiffs' voluntary action in driving or
riding in a car without airbags? In order to know who really caused
the accident and thus who is at fault, we must have more than a
notion of but-for causation, for in this case both the plaintiffs' and
GM's actions are but-for causes of the injury. Yet it will be difficult
for us to arrive at such a notion without invoking other legal concepts, such as fault.
To understand this point better, suppose that a plaintiff drove a
GM car while drunk and then sued GM for not installing a device
that made it impossible for a person to start the ignition without passing a breathalyzer test. Would we say that GM caused this accident
by failing to install such a device, even if the cost of this device were
minimal in comparison to the number of lives that might be saved by
it? Or would we say that the cause of the accident was the plaintiff's
drunken driving? Perhaps we would distinguish the breathalyzer case
on the grounds that a person who drives drunk causes the accident
because he is at fault. Note, however, that at this point causation has
become parasitic on notions of fault, instead of the other way around.
Yet the same is true of the airbags case. In order to know whether
GM or the plaintiffs caused the harm, we might have to decide
whether GM was at fault for placing a product on the market that
could have been safer, or whether the plaintiffs were at fault for
choosing to purchase and misuse the product. Fault, causation, contract, and property rights have all become intertwined.
These conclusions are related to Hohfeld's basic idea that a legal
right is a privilege to inflict harm that is either not legally cognizable
or is otherwise without legal remedy. The concept of legal fault
depends upon whether one is acting within one's rights, but of course
16. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 751-52, 761

(1987).
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one's rights depend upon the corresponding rights of others to protection from harm, while those harms that the law will remedy depend
upon what one's rights are, and so on. Thus, legal fault and legally
remediable harm become two sides of the same coin, while legal rights
and legally nonremediable harm are also two sides of the same coin.
Indeed, we can understand all of our rights of contract and property,
or our rights to freedom of action and protection of our security, as
allocations of power by the state. Put another way, these are privileges granted by the state to private actors to inflict nonremediable
harms upon each other. My right to freedom of contract involves my
right to injure my competitors by underselling them, to injure my
employees by fixing their wages and working conditions, or to injure
my customers by refusing to deal with them or by raising my prices.
My property rights involve my right to use my property in a way
others do not like, as well as my right to invoke the aid of the state if
someone attempts to take my property from me or put it to a contrary
use. Private property is a state sanctioned monopoly in the use and
disposition of things, enforced by the state's monopoly over the use
and license of legally sanctioned violence.
III.

SEMIOTIC STRUCTURE AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

The previous analysis has been derived from the particular semiotic structure of American law-the relationships of mutual definition
that constitute legal concepts such as fault, causation, harm, and
rights. But there is much more that follows from the analysis. These
semiotic structures are just that-structures in which debates about
fault, causation, harm, and rights are carried out, and which constitute these concepts. These structures do not change when the particular issues of liability are altered any more than the basic structures of
a language change when a new sentence is spoken or written. These
linguistic structures are what is common to the various spoken or
written tokens of a language.
Many, if not most questions of law involve the issue we have
been dealing with in the last few pages-whether to expand or contract the privilege to inflict nonremediable harm on others. Yet the
semiotic structure of legal concepts guarantees that this question may
also always be understood at the same time as the question whether
there has been legal fault, legally compensable harm, or an invasion of
legal rights. Thus, to argue for the expansion of the privilege to do
harm is to argue that an actor was not legally at fault, did not cause
harm compensable by the legal system, or did not violate the legal
rights of another. Conversely, to argue for the contraction of the priv-
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ilege to do harm is to argue that an actor was legally at fault, did
cause harm that the legal system should compensate, or did violate
the legal rights of another.
Thus, whenever we consider a legal issue that concerns whether
the privilege to inflict nonremediable harm should be expanded or
contracted, there is always a fault based argument for liability and a
fault based argument against liability, a compensation based argument for liability, and a compensation based argument against liability, a rights based argument for liability and a rights based argument
against liability, and so on for other legal concepts in the system. This
is not to say that these arguments will all be equally convincing. In
many cases they will not. Rather, the semiotic character of legal concepts guarantees the formal possibility of such arguments on each side
of the legal issue presented.
From this insight we can connect the work of Hohfeld and the
legal realists to more recent developments in legal theory, in particular work by members of the Critical Legal Studies movement. Our
analysis of legal concepts has shown that because debates over many,
if not most, legal rules share the same structure-that such debates all
concern whether to expand or contract the privilege to inflict
nonremediable harm-the arguments used in these legal debates will
all have a common structure. This result is consistent with work done
by Professor Duncan Kennedy, who has argued that whenever legal
lawyers debate rule choices they tend to use a stereotypical set of pro
and con arguments. 17 Kennedy also created a classification system
for these various argument forms. I have extended and elaborated
upon both this basic insight and Kennedy's classificatory scheme in
my own writings."8 The importance of the connection between
Hohfeld's insight and Kennedy's is that the existence of these standard sorts of pro and con policy arguments is not simply accidental,
or due to the fact that lawyers are unimaginative souls. Rather, it
follows from the semiotic character of legal concepts.
What one discovers, then, when one studies the forms of legal
discourse, is that the basic styles of argument do not vary as one
moves from one set of rule choices to another. Thus, there is a
17. Eg., Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REv. 563
(1982); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685
(1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance].
18. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1986).

Other scholars who have adopted Kennedy's classifications of legal argument in one form or
another include James Boyle and Jeremy Paul. See Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34
Am. U.L. REv. 1003 (1985); Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REv. 915 (1988).
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remarkable similarity between the arguments for a negligence standard in tort law as opposed to a rule of no duty, on the one hand, and
the arguments for strict liability as opposed to negligence, on the
other. Similarly, the debate between strict liability and negligence is
recapitulated in subdoctrinal debates within negligence law-for
example, whether to have an objective or a subjective standard of negligence, whether children engaging in adult activities should be held
to the same standard of negligence as adults, and whether to have a
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This feature of legal argument I call the
crystalline structure of legal thought, because the structure of a crystal is always identical regardless of the portion of the crystal one is
looking at, and moreover, because the structure of a crystal is identical whether viewed on a large scale or a small scale. 19 In the same
way, macrolevel debates about legal rules are replicated in microlevel
debates about subdoctrinal rule choices, and even in debates about
particular applications of legal rules.
Furthermore, this crystalline structure is not merely confined to
arguments about such concepts as legal rights, causation, fault, and
property. To be sure, the examples given above involving GM and
airbags concerned only two types of arguments, which we might label
rights arguments and arguments of moral responsibility and desert.
However, there are many other kinds of arguments as well. For
example, we might try to solve the question of whether to adopt a rule
of negligence or no duty by asking which rule would have the most
desirable social consequences. However, even when we shift from a
rights-based inquiry to consequentialism, we discover that there are
stereotypical pro and con arguments that have the following general
form: The plaintiffs argue that the rule requiring greater liability
leads to better consequences because it will give defendants incentives
to engage in socially desirable behavior, while the defendants argue
that the opposite rule is necessary to give the plaintiffs incentives to
engage in socially desireable behavior. The plaintiffs will respond that
giving plaintiffs additional incentives by denying them recovery will
not work and will only punish the plaintiff class for things it has no
control over, thus leaving society worse off in the long run. The
defendants will respond that the rule of greater liability will not work
and will only punish the defendant class for things it has no control
over, and this will only make society worse off in the long run.20
19. Balkin, supra note 18, at 2-3, 36-41.
20. Id. at 32-33, 89-93. Like arguments concerning rights and moral responsibility, these
social utility arguments also have a semiotic character. The notions of "best consequences" or
"excess of social cost over social benefit" or even "cheapest cost avoider" which generate these
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Nor is the list of pro and con arguments exhausted by arguments
of social utility. There are also arguments concerning which rule is
easier to administer judicially, arguments about whether a particular
decision maker has the authority or competence to decide the issue,
and so on.21 However, each of these argument forms has its own crystalline structure--each recurs both in macro and micro level debates
about legal rules.
The connection between the recurrent forms of legal argument
and the Hohfeldian approach to legal semiotics is important for two
reasons. First, it provides a satisfying link between semiotics, legal
realism, and Critical Legal Studies. It demonstrates that the recurrent forms of legal argument and the manipulability of legal concepts
such as causation, fault, and duress are all manifestations of the same
characteristics of legal language and legal thought. Second, this semiotic analysis avoids a number of methodological problems that have
plagued the Critical Legal Studies movement almost from its
inception.
When Professor Kennedy first stated his hypothesis about recurring argument forms in his famous article Form and Substance in Pivate Law Adjudication, he gave a structuralist justification for the
phenomenon.22 He argued that the forms of argument involved in
each rule choice recapitulated a fundamental opposition between self
and other, or as he called it, between individualism and altruism. 23 In
The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 4 I also used an essentially structuralist analysis, showing that the argument forms represented two orientations-one denying responsibility for the effects of
one's behavior on other persons in society (individualism) and the
other2 5 emphasizing the responsibility for those effects (communalism). In the earlier discussion of airbags, for example, the plaintiffs'
arguments would be classified as altruist or communalist, while GM's
arguments would be classified as individualist. In either case, the
"cause" of the recurring forms of argument, the reason they existed,
was a "fundamental contradiction" in social life that was both real
forms of argument are also constituted by a play of differences between concepts, but the
relationships are considerably more complicated and beyond the scope of this Essay.
21. Balkin, supra note 18, at 42-44, 106-10; Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 17,
at 1694-701, 1751-53.
22. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 17, at 1712-13. For an introduction to
structuralism, see T. HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOncs (1977).
23. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 17, at 1713-24.
24. Balkin, supra note 18.
25. Id at 13-19.
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and permanent.26
However, structuralism as a methodology has its problems, as
the many post structuralist critiques have shown. Structuralist analyses, like other products of culture, do not describe things actually
existing in the world-they are themselves interpretations which
impose and constitute intellectual order upon the world; moreover,
they tend to be ahistorical interpretations. These features of structuralism do not rob structuralist analyses of their utility, but do
require us to subsume such analyses under a more generalized semiotic and historical understanding.
For example, the fundamental contradiction between individualism and altruism is just another concept defined by the play of differences; this split is no less an interpretation of social life dependent
upon the values assigned to other concepts than is the notion of fault
or causation in our airbags example. Indeed, one could explain the
existence of the recurring forms of legal argument in other ways.
Instead of grounding the analysis of argument forms on the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding behavior, as Kennedy
did, one could have used notions of greater or lesser responsibility
owed to others, as I did in The Crystalline Structure of Legal
Thought.27 Or one could view legal arguments as generated by a deep
division between classical liberalism and a philosophy of social engineering, or even the masculine and the feminine principles of social
order.2 Furthermore, the ability to generate various argument forms
from one of these sets of oppositions does not give that set of oppositions a privileged status over all others. For example, the opposition
between greater or lesser responsibility would not make "responsibility" the master concept that would replace Kennedy's fundamental
contradiction between individualism and altruism.
Our ability to derive the existence of recurring argument forms
about legal responsibility from the Hohfeldian or Saussurian analysis
of legal concepts obviates the need to adopt a thoroughgoing structuralism in the face of the many important post-structuralist critiques.
Once we understand that legal concepts are constituted by a play of
differences, or to use deconstructive language, by relations of diffdrance,29 we do not need to postulate the actual existence of a "fundamental contradiction" in social life as the cause of the recurring forms
26.
(1979).
27.
28.
29.

Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 209, 211-13
Balkin, supra note 18.
See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1987).
See supra note 16.
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of legal argument. Rather, the "fundamental contradiction" is a
symptom of a culturally created and historically contingent system of
differences that also produces the crystalline structure of legal arguments concerning responsibility. The organization of rule choices
around the decision whether to expand or contract the legal privilege
to inflict nonremediable injury, coupled with the semiotic character of
legal concepts, is sufficient to generate sets of pro and con arguments
that might be termed individualist or communalist.
Under this interpretation, ideas such as individualism and communalism (or altruism) remain useful heuristic categories for organizing legal ideologies, but they are only that-interpretations good
enough for the purposes at hand. In this way we can preserve the
insights gained from the study of argument forms without committing
ourselves to an untenable metaphysics. Moreover, such a stance is
more consistent with a vigorous commitment to transforming our
political and legal institutions, for it avoids the natural temptation of
a structuralist determinism-that we must reconcile ourselves to living in a world of fundamental contradiction from which we can never
escape and which can never be improved.

IV. THE SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF LEGAL
IDEOLOGY

The Saussurian or Hohfeldian approach to legal semiotics, I have
argued, is based upon two related ideas. First, legal concepts, no less
than other linguistic concepts, result from a system of differences.
Second, because of the semiotic characteristics of legal thought, the
basic structure of legal arguments about rules and about the application of rules does not change, but repeats across various areas of doctrine. Where is this type of semiotic analysis likely to lead us? Why
should we be interested either in the mutual self-definition of legal
concepts or in discovering the basic structures of legal argument? The
answers can be summed up in one word: ideology. The Saussurian
approach to legal thought leads us directly into the sort of ideological
analysis that has been a major focus of semiotics since Barthes' pioneering work.3 °
We should begin by noting that the semiotics of law, conceived in
the way I have described it, is radically anti-essentialist. This should
come as no surprise. Because Saussure's linguistics is anti-essentialist,
it stands to reason that a Saussurian or Hohfeldian theory of legal
concepts would also be skeptical about essences.
30. See, eg., R. BAnmTHs, MYTHOLOGIES (1972).
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However, the rejection of essentialism in law has important political and philosophical consequences that become increasingly apparent as one moves from the realm of linguistics to that of social theory.
Although people may accept as an abstract matter that linguistic
meaning is conventional, it is more controversial to assert that all
products of culture, and especially legal and political concepts, are
equally conventional in Saussure's sense of that term. People are
quite willing to acknowledge that what we mean by the term "dog,"
for example, is a matter of convention. However, they are considerably more resistant to the notion that consent is also a completely conventional concept, that property has no essential attributes, or that
democracy is a notion defined only by the play of differences. Nevertheless, conclusions of this sort follow from the acceptance of the
Saussurian principle of the arbitrary nature of the signifier and the
fact that legal concepts are signifiers or texts. To use a well-worn
phrase, semiotic inquiry is designed to "demystify" the products of
culture, and show their conventional and ideological nature. This is
no less true of semiotic analyses of legal concepts than it is of semiotic
analyses of magazine advertisements.
An example may help clarify this point. The American system of
government is premised upon the idea that democracy is the most
legitimate form of government, and that the will of the majority
should decide what regulations are imposed on individuals in society.
It is also an article of faith that judicial review is essentially anti-democratic, and is only justified to the extent necessary to enforce constitutional norms, one of those norms being, of course, to protect
democratic government. All this would seem to indicate that judges
should strive to avoid overturning legislative action or overseeing
executive decision making unless it is clearly contrary to the Constitution. Thus, judicial review is an exception to the basic structure of
American democracy that should be eliminated as much as possible if
our government is to retain legitimacy.
This privileging of democracy over judicial review, however,
relies upon a set of ideological presuppositions that ascribe what
appears to be a real property, "democracy," to existing political institutions, simultaneously evoking notions of respect and authority associated with our collective commitments to democracy. Yet
"democracy" is a concept constituted by its relationships to other
concepts. How do we know that existing political institutions are
democratic? Are institutions democratic merely if they result from
elections by a majority of those voters made eligible by law who actually vote? Suppose the right to vote is limited to white male property
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owners, and that legislatures are largely composed of persons elected
from gerrymandered districts. In what sense are the laws produced
by this legislature "democratic" and hence worthy of judicial deference? Do we have "democracy" if access to the political process is
skewed by maldistributions of economic power, so that the poorer a
candidate, the less likely it is that she will have enough money to
afford television and radio advertising and otherwise survive the rigors of modem political campaigning? Is judicial deference to legislatures appropriate in a state with a legacy of racism and sexism, in
which existing power structures result from past denials of equality
and civil rights?
Judicial deference to government officials in the name of "democracy" thus depends upon a panoply of unspoken assumptions about
fair play, equal opportunity, procedural justice, and so on. The concept we call "democratic self-government," normally accorded iconic
significance, is no more and no less parasitic upon other concepts than
were fault, consent, or property, in our earlier examples. Once we
bring these connections to the surface, we can use the concept of
democracy to critique what are purportedly democratic institutions.
Indeed, once we acknowledge that a legislature of white male property owners elected from "rotten boroughs" bears only a superficial
resemblance to democracy, we might discover that judicial review of
legislative action is absolutely essential to the preservation of democratic self-government, because one cannot truly have a democracy
unless one has guarantees of equal opportunity, or protection of individual rights that are enforceable against what purports to be majority
rule but is actually a perversion of it.
Thus, a semiotics of legal concepts becomes essential to performing the type of cultural criticism of law that we have become accustomed to in other areas of semiotic inquiry. The legal semiotician
must ask how the terms of legal discourse, like "democracy," "equality," "fault," or "consent," are systematically related to other concepts in legal doctrine and legal argument. By carefully analyzing
these connections, we can understand both the clash of ideologies
within liberal legal culture, and the underlying ideology of liberal
legal culture itself.
V.

SEMIOTICS AND THE STUDY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT

The study of the recurrent forms of legal argument is a special
case of this general semiotic approach. Interestingly, it has a number
of useful functions in addition to assisting us in the study of ideology.
For example, once lawyers and law students master a set of argument
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forms they can become relatively fluent in legal discourse, and indeed,
they can generate arguments and counterarguments for virtually any
legal position almost at will. Here the analogy between law and language becomes quite close. One can learn the forms of legal argument
in the same way that one can learn how to decline Latin nouns or
conjugate French verbs. To use a Saussurian phrase, the study of
legal argument becomes the study of the langue of legal concepts and
their associated argument forms. 3 '
Besides its more pedagogical and practical uses, however, the
study of the langue of legal argument is intimately related to the semiotic project of understanding the ideology of legal culture. Categorizing the different forms of legal argument helps us to understand
and classify legal ideologies in terms of their associated argument
forms. I have found that a helpful way of organizing American political ideologies is by asking what kinds of arguments they are more
likely to accept or reject with respect to particular rights.
For example, traditional liberals tend to make relatively individualist arguments in certain areas such as freedom of speech and reproduction, while taking relatively communalist positions where
economic liberties are concerned. Interestingly, traditional conservatives have taken precisely the opposite views. These systematic relationships lead to interesting symmetries in liberal and conservative
arguments, and allow for more powerful analyses of political ideology
in America. Liberals have pressed for increasingly strict rules of
responsibility in tort law except in the areas of defamation and privacy law, while conservatives have resisted these efforts and
attempted to move in precisely the opposite direction. Conservatives
have pressed for deregulation of business interests while simultaneously advocating regulation of reproductive interests. The systematic
difference in conservative arguments regarding the sanctity of freedoms in the boardroom and the bedroom is a helpful insight into the
sources of traditional conservative ideology, just as the opposing orientations in liberal thought allow us to understand its characteristic
ideological features.
Moreover, as time passes, these traditional forms of liberalism
and conservatism will change and fragment. As we witness the emergence of libertarian conservatives who differ with traditional conservatives on free speech and privacy issues, and leftists who have
31. By "langue," Saussure meant the underlying rules and forms of a language (for
example, its rules of grammar, syntax, and phonology), as opposed to particular written or
spoken examples of a language, which he called "parok." F. DE SAussuRE, supra note 4, at 915.
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embraced regulation of free speech in the name of sexual and racial
equality, we can use the study of legal argument to understand the
nature of ideological change in America.
Still another use of the study of argument forms is internal critique of legal doctrine-that is, locating areas of doctrine that are in
tension or contradiction. 32 Because the basic forms of argument do
not change when one moves from rule choice to rule choice, it soon
becomes apparent that the law is replete with tensions and conflicts
that can be used to offer useful critiques of legal doctrine and legal
reasoning.
Let me give just a few examples. It is generally agreed in American criminal law that persons should not be subject to imprisonment
unless their actions were accompanied by an appropriate degree of
mens rea, which normally means at least reckless behavior, and often
requires knowledge or purpose to commit a particular act.3 3 Thus,
ordinary (as opposed to gross) negligence is usually not sufficient to
convict the defendant for a crime punishable by imprisonment, 34 and
strict liability offenses normally allow only punishment by fines. Nevertheless, in many states a criminal defendant can be convicted of first
degree murder under the felony murder rule if she participated in the
commission of a felony in which a person was killed, even if the death
was entirely. accidental. 3 This is, in effect, a strict liability standard
for murder.
Moreover, when one considers doctrines of justification or excuse
like necessity, self-defense, or duress, a similar problem arises. A
defense is available only if the defendant reasonably believed in the
existence of an emergency (in the case of necessity), 36 if she reasonably believed that her life was in imminent danger (in the case of selfdefense) 37 or if the will of a person of reasonable firmness would have
been overborne (in the case of duress). 38 But the requirement that the
defendant conform to the conduct of a hypothetical reasonable person
32. By "contradiction," I do not mean merely logical contradictions. These rarely occur
in legal doctrine. Rather, I mean antinomal conflicts of value that are not convincingly
resolved by existing legal materials. See Balkin, supra note 18, at 70 n. 137.
33. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (presumption that mens rea for an offense
must be at least recklessness unless there is explicit statement to the contrary).
34. See, e-g., id. § 2.02(2)(d) (Criminal negligence involves gross deviation from reasonable
care.).
35. See, eg., State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487, 553 P.2d 279 (1976) (upholding conviction
for first-degree murder involving illegally possessed firearm which discharged accidentally
when defendant slipped in snow).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
37. See, eg., State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 247 A.2d 669 (1968).
38. See, eg., State v. Tuscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977).
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reinstitutes a negligence standard with respect to justification and
excuse, even when purpose, knowledge, or recklessness must be
proved for the material elements of the crime. 39 The debate over
whether to require a degree of mens rea greater than ordinary negligence for conviction is recapitulated at the next level of doctrine (the
standard of care required for justification or excuse), and interestingly, the arguments that were rejected at the first level are accepted
at the second.
Now, in some sense, conflicts of this sort in the law are unavoidable. We have strict liability for injuries caused by defective products,
but not strict liability for injuries caused by false speech because the
governing ideology of the day reflects a higher regard for freedom of
speech of newspapers than for the economic freedom of manufacturers.' In fact, I have argued in The Crystalline Structure of Legal
Thought that it is a vain hope to believe that we could eliminate all
such tensions and conflicts, and that legal thought is irreducibly antinomal.' However, the fact that some tensions and conflicts are inevitable does not mean that all are, or that our recognition of particular
tensions and conflicts within legal doctrine might not convince us to
change the law.
For example, once we recognize the obvious tension between the
felony murder rule and our abhorrence of imprisonment for strict liability offenses, we might be persuaded to change our minds about the
justice of the rule. Moreover, once we realize that a reasonable person
test in self-defense doctrine reinstitutes a negligence standard that is
at odds with the requirements of mens rea, we might want to alter the
self defense doctrine in some respects. For example, we might be
more sympathetic to the claims of battered wives who shoot their
spouses in a sincere but unreasonable belief that there was nothing
they could have done to protect themselves from serious bodily injury
or death.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hohfeld's basic approach to the analysis of legal rights has
proven amazingly fertile, and I would argue that its fertility stems
39. Professor Gary Peller offered this example. Conversation with Gary Peller, Professor
of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, in Austin, Texas (Fall 1988).
40. Interestingly enough, however, 100 years ago the situation was precisely reversedlibel was a strict liability tort, while products liability was governed by a much lesser standard
of care. In fact, where there was no privity of contract or express warranty, virtually no duty
of care was owed at all. The presence of these symmetrical changes in legal doctrine, however,
is just another example of how semiotic analysis helps us to understand legal ideology.
41. Balkin, supra note 18, at 67-77.
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from its striking resemblance to Saussure's ideas concerning the arbitrary nature of the signifier. Indeed, Hohfeld's analysis might best be
viewed as a special case of Saussure's work applied to the discourse of
legal rights. Understood in this light, Hohfeld's analysis applies not
only to arguments about rights but to all legal concepts. This general
form of analysis has been continued in the work of the legal realists
and the Critical Legal Studies movement. We can thus reinterpret the
work of Hohfeld, the legal realists, and various members of the Critical Legal Studies movement as part of a tradition of legal semiotics
that has combined analytic depth with political commitment.
The value of this approach to legal semiotics is threefold. First,
it has analytic significance. Understanding legal concepts as systems
of differences reveals important relationships between legal concepts,
as for example, the connections between fault and property, or
between contract and causation. This analysis also makes manifest
the contingency and manipulability of legal concepts, knowledge that
will prove useful to anyone who works with the materials of the law.
The study of legal argument forms allows us to classify and generate
arguments for virtually any legal rule choice. It also allows us to spot
tensions and conflicts within and across different areas of legal
doctrine.
Second, this approach to legal semiotics allows us to understand
legal ideology. The study of legal ideology is in large part the study of
the system of differences that constitutes legal thought. The
Hohfeldian approach allows us to bring ideological presuppositions to
the surface by exposing the connections between legal ideas. The
structure of legal ideology is also reflected in the forms of legal argument that people use, and the ways in which their use of legal argument changes over time.
Third, the Hohfeldian tradition, especially as it has been practiced by the legal realists and the Critical Legal Studies movement,
serves as an instrument for progressive change. The demonstration
of tensions and conflicts within bodies of legal doctrine may serve as a
spur to reconstruction and reform. More generally, the recovery of
the ideological presuppositions reflected in doctrine may have a therapeutic effect that will assist us to remake our laws and our society.
Clearly, there are many ways of applying semiotics to law that
lawyers and scholars could fruitfully undertake. Yet what better
promise could a theory of legal semiotics hold for us than to provide
at one and the same time an interpretive science of legal thought, a
methodology for the sociology of legal knowledge, and an instrument
for social change? It is my belief that the Hohfeldian approach to
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legal semiotics has the potential to fulfill that promise in all three
respects, and that is why we should diligently pursue it.

